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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines salary structure types (hierarchical or compressed) as 
predictors of team performance in the National Hockey League (NHL). Additionally, an 
analysis of goalie statistics is completed in order to determine what, if any, performance 
measures relate to salary. Data in this research were collected from the 2005-06 season up 
to the 2010-11 season.  
Salary inequality/equality (Gini coefficient) was used in a regression analysis to 
determine if it was an effective predictor of team performance (n = 178) (winning 
percentage). The results indicated that a hierarchical salary structure increased team 
performance, although the amount of variability explained was very small.  
Another regression analysis was completed to determine if any goalie 
performance measures (n = 245) were effective predictors of individual salary. A 
regression analysis was employed and indicated that goalie performance measures 
predicted 19.8% of variance to salary. The only statistical significant variable was games 
played.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 

The salaries of professional athletes have been the subject of significant scrutiny 
in the popular press, but have received less attention in academic research. Professional 
sport offers a unique opportunity to examine whether a salary is related to the 
performance of both organizations (teams) and employees (players). Salary statistics have 
become widely available and are a rich analytical resource. Employees from professional 
sport leagues keep track of statistics that provide offensive and defensive information, as 
well as individual salaries. These statistics enable individual performance scrutiny in 
relation to remuneration level. This provides a context dissimilar to other professions 
where an individual’s salary is often unavailable to the public. Additionally, based on a 
person’s job it may be harder to measure individual contribution to organizational 
success. An example would entail measuring and quantifying the success of a physical 
trainer for a hockey team. However, in the case of professional athletes, interest and 
measurability have led to further scrutiny and measurement of how salary relates to 
performance. 
Using statistics to determine future individual performance was popularized by 
Michael Lewis (2003) in his book Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game. Lewis 
(2003) outlined the story of Major League Baseball (MLB) general manager Billy Beane 
of the Oakland Athletics. Wolfe, Wright, and Smart (2006) describe how Beane 
exploited the inefficiency (baseball’s labor market) by implementing a radical 
human resource management innovation— an employee (player) performance 
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measurement and feedback system that allowed him to field a highly competitive 
team while having one of the lowest payrolls in Major League Baseball. (p. 112) 
This caught the attention of many sport fans as Moneyball became a best-selling book and 
movie.  
 Additionally, other books such as Hockeynomics, written by Norman, (2009) 
examine various statistics to identify the best players in the National Hockey League 
(NHL), as well as determining which players are the most cost effective.  The Sports 
Network (TSN) has a specific segment on its website designated to team and individual 
performance rankings based on statistical formulations. Many Canadians consider hockey 
to be Canada’s sport (Norman, 2009), and, as a result, there are many popular press 
magazines, books, and television shows which deal with the analysis of hockey. 
Furthermore, the history of players’ salaries has also been heavily documented (USA 
Today Salary Database, 2011).  
History of Salaries 

Historically, professional athletes have not always had fair treatment in potential 
salary earnings. For sports such as hockey and baseball, players were owned by teams 
through a reserve clause (Staudohar, 1996). This reserve clause allowed a team to retain 
the rights to sign a player the following year, once they signed a contract for the present 
year; this meant the team essentially had the option of owning the player’s rights forever 
(Staudohar, 1996). The reserve clause did not allow for free agency because player 
movement was highly restricted and did not allow players to earn their potential market 
value. In the 1950s and 1960s, players across different leagues unionized to gain some 
power over ownership. Once this was accomplished, the reserve clause was eliminated 
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from future collective bargaining agreements (CBA) (Staudohar, 1996). Within the first 
CBA (for MLB) only certain players were eligible for free agency, thereby creating a 
decrease in supply and an increase in demand of available players. As a result, over the 
course of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the market 
price of players has risen dramatically (Staudohar, 1996). Table 1 outlines the fluctuations 
in average salary of players in the NHL from the 1984-85 season to the 2010-11 season. 
The 2000-01 to the 2010-11 season average salary was calculated by taking the team with 
the highest and lowest individual salary averages, adding their averages and dividing the 
total by two. The table also outlines the highest earning athletes and their salary for a 
given season. 
Clearly, the salaries of players have changed dramatically (an approximate 1300% 
increase in highest paid salary from 1984-85 season to the 2010-11 season); this change 
coupled with the symbiotic relationship between sport and media has created an appealing 
avenue for academics to study the phenomenon of salary and its effect on both team and 
individual performance. Therefore, understanding different types of salary structures is 
fundamental to exploring the connection between individual salary and team 
performance.  
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Table 1 – NHL Season Individual Salaries -1984-85 to 2010-11 
Season Avg Salary Highest Salary Highest Paid Player 
1984-85  $149,000.00  $725,000.00 Dave Taylor 
1985-86  $159,000.00  $775,000.00 Dave Taylor 
1986-87  $173,000.00  $825,000.00 Dave Taylor 
1987-88  $184,000.00  $900,000.00 Dave Taylor 
1988-89  $201,000.00  $1,620,000.00 Mario Lemieux 
1989-90  $232,000.00  $2,284,000.00 Mario Lemieux 
1990-91  $263,000.00  $2,432,000.00 Wayne Gretzky 
1991-92  $369,000.00  $2,786,000.00 Mark Messier 
1992-93  $463,000.00  $3,342,000.00 Wayne Gretzky 
1993-94  $558,000.00  $7,353,000.00 Wayne Gretzky 
1994-95  $600,000.00  $6,545,000.00 Wayne Gretzky 
1995-96  $1,017,190.00  $6,545,363.00 Wayne Gretzky 
1996-97  $839,994.00  $11,321,429.00 Mario Lemieux 
1997-98  $1,088,576.00  $17,000,000.00 Joe Sakic 
1998-99  $1,190,808.00  $14,000,000.00 Sergei Federov 
1999-00  $1,222,191.00  $10,359,852.00 Jaromir Jagr 
2000-01  $1,464,610.50  $10,000,000.00 Peter Forsberg, Paul Kariya 
2001-02  $1,822,237.50  $11,000,000.00 Peter Forsberg, Jaromir Jagr 
2002-03  $2,025,433.50  $11,483,333.00 Jaromir Jagr 
2003-04  $1,979,774.00  $11,000,000.00 Peter Forsberg, Jaromir Jagr 
2004-05  N/A  N/A N/A 
2005-06  $1,352,385.50  $8,360,000.00 Jaromir Jagr 
2006-07  $1,564,601.50  $8,360,000.00 Jaromir Jagr 
2007-08 
 $1,839,470.00  $10,000,000.00 
Daniel Briere, Thomas Vanek, 
Scott Gomez 
2008-09  $2,238,307.00  $10,000,000.00 Danny Heatley 
2009-10  $2,093,949.00  $10,000,000.00 Vincent Lecavalier  
2010-11 
 $1,936,586.00  $10,000,000.00 
Vincent Lecavalier/Roberto 
Luongo 
 (Fort, 2011, Staudohar, 1996, p.136 & USA Today Salary Database). 
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Salary Structure and Performance 

 This research study uses different concepts to explain the interplay of players’ 
individual performances on the outcomes of teams for different sports, as well as the 
differences between types of salary structures. The following major theoretical concepts 
apply to this thesis:  
 Hierarchical salary structures: employees’ salaries are highly dispersed. For 
example, Bloom (1999) describes hierarchical salary structures as “a greater 
proportion of pay is concentrated in relatively few levels, jobs, or individuals that 
are near the top of the distribution” (p. 25). This type of salary structure is used 
sometimes for promotional purposes, and employs money as a means of 
rewarding those that are successful.  
 Compressed salary structures: employees’ salaries are condensed. For example, 
Bloom (1999) describes compressed salary structures as “one in which pay is less 
dispersed and is spread more equally across jobs or individuals, and it may have 
fewer pay levels” (p. 25). This type of pay structure is used to promote cohesion 
and teamwork among employees.  
 Pooled interdependence: suggests that the individual actions of those playing a 
sport are independent from one another, but are dependent on the outcome. For 
example, when a baseball player bats, their performances are based solely on their 
own batting ability. However, a collection of individual performances (batting) 
results in a team outcome (win or loss). Keidel (1985) describes pooled 
interdependence in baseball as an individual having more of an effect on a team’s 
performance than in other sports. 
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 Sequential interdependence: suggests that it takes a number of subgroups working 
together as a team in order to achieve a collective outcome (Clutterbuck, 2007).  A 
sport that exhibits this characteristic is football (Keidel, 1985). 
 Reciprocal interdependence: this refers mostly to team sports in which a number 
of players’ outputs are needed for an outcome (win or lose). The outcome of team 
performance is linked to overall group performance (Keidel, 1985). Sports that 
exhibit this characteristic include hockey, basketball and soccer.  
 Tournament theory: examines the relationships between hierarchical and 
compressed salary structures, as well as pooled and reciprocal interdependence in 
understanding salaries. Tournament theory investigates the role of individual 
performances relative to a rank order pay system (Frick, 2003). This suggests that 
players that perform better will receive higher pay, and players who are paid less 
will try and improve their performances to increase their salaries (Chuang, Tao, & 
Yu, 2011; Frick, 2003; Huselid, 1992). Tournament theory supposes that a 
hierarchical pay structure increases both team and individual performance (Frick, 
2003). The majority of previous research completed regarding player and team 
performance in relation to salary has used tournament theory (Bognamo, 1990; 
Chuang et al, 2011; Frick, 2003; Huselid, 1992; Lynch, & Zax, 2000). However, 
academic literature has failed to examine the issue of salary determination for 
professional hockey in relation to both team and individual performance. 
A map of the conceptual terminology used in this study is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 – Map of Conceptual Terminology 

Salary Structure Types 
Hierarchical Salary Structure Compressed Salary Structure 
• Employees’ salaries are highly 
dispersed.  
• Bloom (1999) describes hierarchical 
salary structures as “a greater 
proportion of pay is concentrated in 
relatively few levels, jobs, or 
individuals that are near the top of the 
distribution” (p.25).  
• Used for promotional tool purposes, 
rewarding those that are successful.  
• Employees’ salaries are condensed.  
• Bloom (1999) describes compressed 
salary structures as “one in which pay is 
less dispersed and is spread more 
equally across jobs or individuals, and it 
may have fewer pay levels” (p.25).  
• This type of pay structure is used to 
promote cohesion and teamwork among 
employees.  
 
Interdependence Sport Types 
Pooled Interdependence Sequential Interdependence Reciprocal Interdependence 
• Suggests that the 
individual actions of 
those playing a sport 
are independent from 
one another, but are 
dependent on the 
outcome.  
• Example of a sport 
would be baseball. A 
batter hits the ball 
individually, but a 
collection of bats are 
needed for a win 
• Suggests that it takes a 
number of subgroups 
working together as a 
team in order for a 
collective outcome 
(Clutterbuck, 2007).   
• A sport that exhibits this 
characteristic is football 
(Keidel, 1985). 
 
• This refers to team sports 
in which a number of 
players’ outputs are 
needed for an outcome 
(win or lose).  
• The outcome of team 
performance is linked to 
overall group 
performance.  
• Examples of sports 
include hockey, 
basketball and soccer.  
Theoretical Terminology 
Tournament Theory 
• Tournament theory investigates the role of individual performances relative to a rank 
order pay system (Frick, 2003).  
• This suggests that players that perform better will receive higher pay, and players 
who are paid less will try and improve their performance to increase their salary  
• Tournament theory supposes that a hierarchical pay structure increases both team and 
individual performance (Frick, 2003).  
Methodological Terminology 
Gini Coefficient  
• The Gini coefficient was created by an Italian economist named Corrado Gini.  
• The Gini coefficient measures levels of economic equality or inequality within a range of 0 
and 1. Zero represents perfect equality (i.e., everyone is paid the same amount), while 1 
represents perfect inequality (i.e., one person on a team is making all of the money).  
• For the purposes of this thesis it will be used to measure salary dispersion among team and 
players.  
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Previous Studies 

Tournament theory has been used in a number of studies across various sports, 
including baseball, football, soccer, basketball, and hockey. According to Keidel (1985), 
major differences in the outcomes of the studies were as a result of pooled and reciprocal 
interdependence. Research into pooled interdependent sports such as baseball found that 
hierarchical salary structures equated to better team and individual performance; while 
research into reciprocal interdependent sports such as soccer, basketball, and hockey 
generally found that compressed salary structures induced better team and individual 
performance (Keidel, 1985). However, the four studies completed using hockey as the 
unit of analysis did not have similar results. Sommers (1998) determined that a 
compressed salary structure was linked to better performance. Gomez’s (2002) results 
were similar to Sommers in that a compressed salary structure increased winning 
percentage. Conversely, Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann (2003) concluded hierarchical 
salary structures increased winning percentage, but only to a small degree. Marchand, 
Smeeding, and Torrey (2006) linked a hierarchical salary structure to better performance.  
Marchand et al. (2006) called for further research in order to more clearly understand the 
link between salary, team, and individual performance in hockey. Additionally, little 
literature exists examining the predictor variables between goalie statistics and salary 
(Berri & Brook, 2010). 
Rationale for this Study 

Studies have focused on team and individual performance in relation to player 
salary; the conclusions drawn from these studies indicate a number of contradictions. As 
previously mentioned, four different studies have been completed using the NHL; these 
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four studies’ results were not congruent with each other. One common connection 
between the four studies is that data were derived from seasons where the NHL did not 
use a salary cap. Therefore, there is a need to examine player salaries in relation to the 
salary cap. This study will use information and data from the period since the NHL 
instituted a salary cap system.   
 In professional sports, it is common for leagues to place a limit on the amount of 
money a team can spend on players’ salaries. Leagues can either have a ‘soft’ cap or a 
‘hard’ cap if they implement a salary cap system. A ‘soft’ cap means that there is a limit a 
team can spend on team salaries, but they can go over the limit. If they go over the 
imposed limit, then they are subject to penalties such as luxury taxes, which can involve a 
percentage of every dollar gone over the limit (Levine, 1995). ‘Hard’ caps set a limit that 
a team cannot surpass. The NHL employs a ‘hard’ salary cap system (Levine, 1995).  
One reason behind a league having a salary cap is that, in theory, the cap creates 
competitive balance amongst all league teams. In any professional league, there are teams 
that are more financially successful than others. Kesenne (2000) argues that salary caps 
prevent teams from spending a significant amount of money on players, and poaching the 
best players in a league. Prior to the imposition of the salary cap, smaller market teams 
were unable to compete with financially successful teams because they did not have the 
capital to sign talented players with large salaries (ESPN, 2004). After the 2004-05 NHL 
lockout, a salary cap was instituted as part of the new CBA. Prior to this CBA, there was 
not a salary cap. This detail is significant because only one study has investigated NHL 
salaries and goalie performance since the implementation of the salary cap for the 2005-
06 season (Berri & Brook, 2010). Furthermore, since the NHL uses a ‘hard’ cap, teams 
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have to abide by the salary cap maximum and minimum. The salary cap floor establishes 
a requirement for a team to follow a minimum salary for players individually, and 
collectively.  The purpose of a salary cap floor is to ensure that teams spend a minimum 
per season so that  an organization does not purposely fail in order to get a high draft pick 
the following season (CBA – NHL and NHLPA, 2005).  
Since the institution of the salary cap, NHL general managers and executives of 
teams across the league must be more strategic with their payroll. The evaluation process 
of players for both signing and drafting is integral to a team’s success. This study will 
directly examine the type of salary structure (hierarchical or compressed) that serves to 
predict team performance. Finally, the study will investigate the predictive ability 
between individual player performance and salary, which is crucial for determining 
whether a player should be signed. This study has significant implications for both NHL 
executives and for the justification of the NHL’s hard cap system.  
Purpose of the Study 

This study investigates salary distribution in relation to team and player 
performance in NHL professional hockey clubs for the regular season. This purpose will 
be addressed through two research questions: 
1. Do salary structure types (hierarchical or compressed) serve to predict team 
performance for NHL professional hockey clubs? 
2. How do NHL goalie performance measures relate to professional goalie salaries? 
Assumptions 

 This researcher assumes there is a linear relationship between salary structure and 
team performance (Avrutin & Sommers, 2007; Bloom, 1999; DeBrock, Hendricks & 
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Koenker, 2004; Depken, 2000; Frick et al, 2003; Jewell & Molina, 2004; Marchand et al., 
2006; Mondello & Maxcy, 2009; Sommers, 1998; Torgler, & Schmidt, 2007; Wisemen & 
Chatterjee, 2003). Additionally, the researcher assumes that there is a linear relationship 
between players’ salaries and performance (statistics) (Bloom, 1999; Frick, 2003; 
Marchand et al, 2006; Torgler & Schmidt, 2007). Both assumptions are important 
because they indicate the primary set of relationships which the study’s research 
questions seek to investigate.  
Additionally, the researcher makes the assumption that tournament theory is the 
most pragmatic theory for the investigation of the relation between salary and 
performance. Previous authors certainly support the use of tournament theory for 
understanding the relationships between player salaries and professional athlete and team 
performance (Avrutin & Sommers, 2007; Bloom, 1999; DeBrock et al., 2004; Depken, 
2000; Frick, 2003; Frick et al., 2003; Jewell & Molina, 2004; Marchand, et al. 2006; 
Mondello & Maxcy, 2009; Sommers, 1998; Torgler, & Schmidt, 2007; Vasilescu, 2007; 
Vasilscu, 2008; Wisemen & Chatterjee, 2003).  
Implications, Limitations & Delimitations 

The results of the study will have significant implications for professional ice 
hockey teams and their player management practices. These will include determining the 
types of salary structures teams should optimally use, which players teams should sign, 
and how much money teams should award on contracts to players. The results will also 
inform goalies as to which statistics are highly predictive of salary. Furthermore, only one 
study has been conducted after the 2004-05 NHL lockout (i.e., since the inception of a 
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hard salary cap) (Berri & Brook, 2010). Marchand et al., (2006) indicated that future 
studies should examine the NHL after the lockout.  
This study is limited by the accuracy of the second hand data that the researcher 
gathers from websites given that the researcher has no way of verifying the data’s 
accuracy. In addressing the second research question, this study is limited to goalie 
salaries from the NHL. Additionally, this study is further limited to the hockey seasons 
from 2005-06 to 2010-11 because the NHL implemented a ‘hard’ cap salary system. The 
study will consider seasons where the NHL had a ‘hard’ cap; all previous studies have 
used data from years where there was not a salary cap.  
Summary 

Salaries of professional athletes have been a fascination of the public for many 
years. There is ample non-academic literature regarding the remuneration of professional 
athlete contracts. Salaries of professional athletes have changed over the course of the 
latter half of the 20th century. A number of studies have been conducted across various 
sports to determine the relationship between salary and performance. Tournament theory 
is the dominant framework for these studies, but conflicting results have been reported in 
previous research on hockey. This study investigates salary distribution in relation to 
team and player performance amongst NHL hockey clubs. The two research questions 
examine salary structure types (hierarchical and compressed), as well as the individual 
performance of goalies in relation to salary.  
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate salary distribution in relation to team 
and player performance in NHL professional hockey clubs. Specifically, the researcher 
seeks to address two salary structure types, hierarchical and compressed, to determine 
their relationship to team performance for NHL teams, and goalie statistical measures in 
relation to individual salaries from 2005-06 through 2010-11. The following factors will 
be discussed to develop the necessary background for this study: (a) salaries in 
professional sport/entertainment industry; (b) salary theory; (c) tournament theory; (d) 
sport performance – interdependence; (e) salary structures and performance; and (f) 
individual performance and salary.  
Salaries in the Professional Sport/Entertainment Industry 

The salaries earned by professional athletes and entertainers are generally higher 
than the public. For example, the average salary of a Canadian citizen before taxes in 
2009 was $37,200 (StatsCan, 2009). The average salary earned by an NHL player at that 
time was $2,093,949. The increase in pay of athlete salaries led to the NHL’s 2004-05 
lockout and is one of the main reasons why the National Football League (NFL) did not 
have a CBA with the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) until July 
25th, 2011 (Browning, 2011). The average salary of a NHL player for the 1994-95 season 
was $600,000 (Staudohar, 1996). In the 2003-04 NHL regular season, a player’s average 
salary was $1,979,774. During the 2010-11 season, the last in this analysis, a player’s 
average salary was $1,936,486. The rise in player’s salaries led the NHL and team owners 
to lose money, which was a cause of the 2004-05 season cancellation (Canadian Press, 
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2005). According to TSN (2008), a key element of the new CBA being accepted was a 
salary cap. The owners wanted a salary cap and after a season long lockout the National 
Hockey League Player’s Association (NHLPA) agreed as they had lost bargaining power 
in the negotiations. The 2005-06 season salary cap was set at $39 million per team (TSN, 
2008). Three years after the lockout, the average players’ salary increased by 11% (TSN, 
2008). In 2008, the salary cap was set at $50.3 million (TSN, 2008). The fluctuation of 
salaries between the 1994-95 season to the 2010-11 season changed dramatically. With 
average salaries and the hard cap on the rise, it becomes even more important for 
managers of teams to strategically manage the money accounted for players salaries. 
Managers must decide whether to sign ‘star players’ to large contracts and risk not being 
able to sign other players due to a lack of funds, or to pay all players relatively the same 
wage. 
Salary Theory 

 According to Bloom (1999), there are two types of salary structures: hierarchical 
and compressed. Hierarchical pay structures are highly dispersed; a small number of 
individuals earn a significant amount of money, while the other employees make a 
fraction of that amount. This type of pay structure is often used to create a competitive 
work environment to reward success (Bloom, 1999). Conversely, a compressed salary 
structure is condensed; all employees earn similar wages. The rationale for using a 
compressed pay structure is the promotion of cohesion among employees (Bloom, 1999). 
Additionally, in each case, attention needs to be drawn to individuals’ perceptions about 
their wages and effort in relation to others within the same organization.  
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 Akerlof and Yellen (1990) discuss the fair wage effort hypothesis that dictates 
individuals will change their level of effort and output based on fair and actual wages. 
Bose, Pal, and Sappington (2010) extend this idea in their paper entitled Equal pay for 
unequal work: Limiting sabotage in teams. The paper examines the ability and likelihood 
of an athlete sabotaging a team’s outcome (win or loss). The researchers conclude that 
sabotage (e.g., individual actions that negatively affect a team, such as not passing a ball) 
can arise in a team where equal pay policies are not prevalent. To know which type of pay 
structure induces better team and individual performance is vital for professional sport 
organizations’ success. 
There have been a number of studies completed examining the relationship 
between salary structures and team performance. The studies have investigated the salary 
structures of MLB, National Basketball Association (NBA), NFL, NHL, Bundesliga 
(soccer league in Germany), and the English Premiership League (EPL; European 
Football). As well, a number of the studies have used tournament theory to explain the 
phenomenon of salary structures and team performance. The majority of these studies 
found that teams with a compressed salary structure performed better than those with 
hierarchical salary structure (Avrutin & Sommers, 2007; Bloom, 1999; DeBrock et al., 
2004; Depken, 2000; Frick et al., 2003; Gomez, 2002; Jewell & Molina, 2004; Mondello 
& Maxcy, 2009; Sommers 1998; Torgler, & Schmidt, 2007; Vasilescu, 2007; & 
Vasilescu, 2008). Other studies found that teams with a hierarchical salary structure 
performed better than those with compressed salary structures (Frick et al., 2003; 
Marchand et al., 2006; Wisemen & Chatterjee, 2003). Additionally, one of the most 
frequently used tools in measuring disparity in salaries and identifying types of salary 
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structures is the Gini coefficient (Avrutin & Sommers 2007; Bloom 1999; Frick et al., 
2003; Gomez, 2002; Jewell & Molina 2004; Marchand et al., 2006; Sommers 1998; 
Vasilescu 2007; Wisemen & Chatterjee 2003).  
 According to Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003), the Gini coefficient is a 
measurement to determine salary inequality. The Gini coefficient has a scale of zero to 
one. Zero represents perfect equality among individual salaries and one represents perfect 
inequality. A team that has a high Gini coefficient has a hierarchical salary structure, 
while those with a smaller Gini coefficient have a compressed salary structure. A full 
explanation of the Gini coefficient is provided in Chapter Three. In order to fully 
understand the dynamics of salary structure and its effect on team and individual 
performance, an examination of tournament theory is necessary. This theory seeks to 
explain team and individual performance based on pay structure. 
Tournament Theory 

Tournament has been used as the theoretical framework for the majority of the 
literature surrounding sport performance and salary. According to Huselid (1992), 
tournament theory examines “the efficiency and incentive properties of reward systems 
based on rank-ordered rather than absolute individual performance” (p. 336). Tournament 
theory is an economic theory that describes marginal productivity to compensation. As 
such, it is possible to deduce that a starting player on a professional sports team should 
have a higher salary than a backup player. Tournament theory suggests that since the 
backup player makes less money, he/she will work harder than the starter to receive the 
starting job and, consequently, the backup will earn more money. Chuang et al., (2011) 
describe tournament theory as “a compensation scheme where the level of pay varies with 
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the relative rank order of an individual in an organization rather than his absolute level of 
performance in the presence of costly monitoring of workers’ efforts and output” (p. 6). 
This theory suggests that players work harder and perform better with a hierarchical 
salary structure (i.e., the difference between the highest and lowest earning player on a 
team is significant) than a compressed salary structure where no single player makes the 
majority of the money. Frick (2003) indicates that tournament theory suggests that intra-
team pay structures need to be hierarchical to induce better player performance.  
The majority of the literature on tournament theory examines individual 
professional sports. Bognamo (1990) examined bowling and found that an increase in pay 
structure had a positive correlation to performance. Ehrenberg and Bognamo (1990a; 
1990b) analyzed two Tours (1984 and 1987) of the Professional Golf Association and 
found that there was a positive correlation between pay structure and performance. Other 
studies that found a positive correlation between pay structure and performance include 
Becker and Huselid (1992) on the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing 
(NASCAR) and Lynch and Zax (2000) on running races. Fernie and Metcalf (1996) 
examined jockeys who received a salary versus those paid according to the amount of the 
race purses they had won. Jockeys paid based on results had a higher performance than 
those on salary. Various studies have linked individual performance to pay structure; 
however, all of the studies deal with individual sports and the outcomes are highly based 
on the individual performance of those athletes. This is unlike team sports where players 
are dependent on the performance of other team members in determining the outcome of 
competition. 
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Conversely, there are theoretical understandings which contradict tournament 
theory. David Levine was one of the pioneers in studying the effects of cohesion in wage 
disparity. In his article, Cohesiveness, Productivity and Wage Dispersion, Levine (1991) 
stated that, “in participatory firms where the firm's policies lead work groups to favor 
increased productivity, the increased cohesiveness increases the group's ability to enforce 
norms of high effort; thus higher cohesiveness will lead to higher productivity” (p. 250). 
Levine clearly states that in organizations where employees are paid similar wages, 
employees experience increased productivity and cohesion. One important factor when 
measuring team and individual performance is the differences in sports and the interplay 
of teammate’s decisions on both team and individual success.  
Sport Performance – Interdependence 

Addressing the level of interdependence between sports is important because 
varying levels of cooperative effort have a direct effect on both team and individual 
outcomes. Interdependence refers to how much individual actions have an effect on final 
group outcomes (Keidel, 1985). As explained earlier, pooled interdependence suggests 
that individual actions of those playing a sport are independent from one another, but are 
dependent in determining the outcome. Sequential interdependence refers to subgroups’ 
collective efforts for an overall outcome. Conversely, reciprocal interdependence refers to 
sports in which a number of players’ collective outputs are needed for an outcome (win or 
loss). In this context, the outcome of team performance is linked to overall group 
performance. These parameters have been used in research by Harder (1992) to describe 
the differences of individual performance in baseball and basketball. His research 
indicated that there was a difference between these two sports based on the level of 
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independence. He found that basketball was more dependence-driven because under-
rewarded players’ selfish behaviour resulted in a negative effect on team outcomes. 
Conversely, he found that in baseball under-rewarded players did not affect team 
outcomes. This research suggests that individual actions between reciprocal, sequential or 
pooled interdependence sports matters when analyzing team and individual performance 
because different players’ actions have different results on team outcomes. Sports 
characterized as having reciprocal interdependence are basketball, soccer, and hockey. In 
the four studies that analyzed hockey in relation to pay structure and team performance, 
there has not been a clear consensus as to whether a hierarchical or compressed pay 
structure is most effective for both team and individual performance.  
Salary Structures and Performance 

 Several important factors pertinent to analyzing team and individual performance 
literature include the type of sport, procedures used to analyze the data (methods), and 
what the outcome may be (pay structure). These factors are important because different 
sports have different types of interdependence (pooled, sequential and reciprocal). The 
methods used by the researcher may result in different outcomes than previous studies. 
Finally, it is important to understand which pay structure is more effective, as they may 
result in sport specific outcomes. The majority of literature regarding pay structures and 
team performance has examined baseball.  
Baseball 

 There have been many studies completed using baseball as the sport of analysis. 
Richards and Guell’s (1998) study of baseball success and salary structure addresses 
whether salary affected large and stable crowds, winning percentage, and championships. 
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Data were collected from 1992 through 1995 and included statistics such as winning 
percentage, team salary, mean salary, as well as success in division and world-series 
championships. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model was used to analyze 
the data. Richards and Guell concluded that a compressed salary structure had a positive 
effect on the ability of teams to win games and championships; however, salary structure 
was not found to affect attendance.  
Bloom (1999) analyzed seasonal data from the 1985 through 1993 MLB seasons. 
Bloom used winning percentage as the dependent variable and found that the higher the 
wage disparity, the lower the team’s performance was (i.e., indicating a negative 
relationship). This indicated that a team with a compressed salary structure had a higher 
winning percentage than one with a hierarchical salary structure. 
Bloom (1999) summarized his findings by suggesting, some writers have 
proposed that compressed pay distributions can be beneficial for group 
performance because they may inculcate feelings of fairness and common 
purpose, foster cooperative, team orientated behavior. Hierarchical is supposed to 
induce higher performance as it means more money. (p. 25)  
Bloom’s hypotheses were supported as they found that increased pay distributions 
(hierarchical salary structures) had a negative effect on team performance. In other words, 
there was a positive relationship between the Gini coefficient and performance.  
Depken (2000) examined MLB data from 1985 through 1998 using winning 
percentage as the dependent variable in his analysis. He used a panel-data approach to test 
the disparity between team salaries and found that “as intra-team wage disparity 
increased, overall team performance is reduced, but it is possible for a team to have a very 
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high total salary but a relatively low salary disparity, and vice-versa” (p. 91). This study 
suggests that having a hierarchical salary structure has a negative effect on team 
performance. Frick et al., (2003) also found that there was a negative relationship 
between salary inequality and team performance in their study of baseball. 
Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003) conducted a correlation analysis between pay and 
performance in baseball. They used winning percentage as their dependent variable and 
used the Gini coefficient to analyze the disparity of wages. Their results were similar to 
previous research in that a smaller Gini coefficient due to a compressed salary structure 
indicated a greater winning percentage for a team.  
DeBrock et al. (2004) used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to examine 
actual wages as a measure for salary distribution. The HHI measures distributional 
inequality and is similar to the Gini coefficient in that its scale ranges from zero to one; 
zero equals perfect equality, while one represents perfect inequality. Their dependent 
variables were winning percentage and attendance. They found that salary inequality had 
a negative relationship to performance. In summary, a compressed salary structure 
induced better team performance. 
Jewell and Molina (2004) studied data from 1985 through 2000 to find a 
relationship between payroll inequality and performance. The dependent variable was 
winning percentage and the Gini coefficient was used to measure salary 
equality/inequality. They were able to calculate “that a 1% increase in the Gini coefficient 
led to a 0.2% decrease in winning percentage” (p. 132). This study suggests that in 
baseball a compressed salary structure generates a higher winning percentage.  
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Avrutin and Sommers (2007) analyzed data from 2001 through 2005 in MLB to 
determine whether a hierarchical or compressed salary structure increased winning 
percentage. Through their analysis, they concluded that a compressed salary structure did 
not lead to better performance. Their results contradicted previous research as the authors 
found that a hierarchical salary structure was better for team performance. Vasilescu 
(2007) refutes other research results by suggesting that,  
Most MLB teams have wage structures which are too spread out, with a larger 
degree of inequality than the optimum. This explains why all previous papers have 
found a negative relationship, since all were measuring the slope of this function 
at the mean (or median) of the wage distribution measure, where it is negative. (p. 
2)  
Vasilescu (2007) also suggested that a major flaw in previous studies is there was a linear 
relationship between wage inequality and team performance. Vasilescu’s research 
indicated the relationship was non-linear. He deduced that teams that had a higher 
winning percentage had a lower Gini coefficient than those with lower winning 
percentages.  
A secondary study by Vasilescu (2008) used a data set that consisted of teams’ 
winning percentages and on-base percentages from MLB to determine whether wage 
inequality had an effect on team performance. However, very little additional information 
was provided specifically about the data set used. Vasilescu suggested that using winning 
percentage as the dependent variable, as most previous studies had done, produces biased 
and inconsistent estimates as wins are counted more than once. Monte Carlo experiments 
were used as the method of analysis. Monte Carlo experiments attempt to reveal linear 
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models through complex computerized algorithms. Through Monte Carlo experiments, 
the researcher was able to find the relationship between wage inequality and winning to 
be non-linear. Vasilescu suggests that there is an optimum level of wage inequality and 
one which maximizes the probability of winning any game. Due to this fact, his evidence 
supports tournament theory as a means of understanding performance and salary in 
baseball.  
Chuang et al. (2011) examined the effect of salary on team performance using 
three different frameworks:  the careers concern model, tournament theory, and pay 
equality theory. They analyzed MLB data from 1985 through 2008 and used an equation 
to measure team performance. The Gini coefficient measured the equality of salary 
distribution. The authors found that there was a negative relationship between a 
hierarchical salary structure and team performance.  
Finally, Annala and Winfree (2011) conducted a study that examined equity 
theory, which dictates that “players will provide effort based on the compensation that 
they receive” (p. 168). They also used relative deprivation theory to explain their results. 
This theory explains that “individuals feel deprivation when they compare their 
compensation to a reference group” (p. 168). Annala and Winfree used data from 1985 
through 2004 and calculated Gini coefficients. They discovered greater inequality in 
salary distribution led to a negative impact on overall team performance (i.e., Gini 
coefficient had a negative relationship to team performance).  
Through the analysis of previous research on baseball regarding salary structure 
and team performance, it is clear that sports which have characteristics of pooled 
interdependence perform better with a compressed salary structure. This research also 
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indicates that tournament theory does not explain wage disparities in baseball; however, 
sports such as soccer, basketball and hockey, which have characteristics of reciprocal 
interdependence, may differ.  
Football 
Football is a sport classified as relying on sequential interdependence. Mondello 
and Maxcy (2009) conducted a study to see if team performance increased when the team 
had a heavily incentive-based pay structure (hierarchical), or salary-based pay structure 
(compressed). The researchers examined the pay structures of NFL teams from 2000 
through 2007. A total of 254 club year observations were made and a regression analysis 
was completed using these statistics. The authors also used a two factor fixed effects 
model, which included fixed and random effects. The results showed that salary 
dispersion had a significant positive effect on on-field performance. Conversely, Frick et 
al. (2003) found no direct link between salary inequality and a team’s performance in 
their examination of the NFL. 
Soccer 
Hall, Szymanski, and Zimbalist (2002) investigated payroll and performance to 
ascertain whether pay created performance or vice versa. Using English Premier League 
(EPL) payroll data from 1980 through 2000, they found that the more money teams spent 
on players, the more talent they were able to attract and, as a result, these teams were 
more successful on the field. Additionally, they discovered that for every additional dollar 
the team spent on salary in comparison to the league average, a team’s winning 
percentage increased. The EPL does not have a salary cap and teams can spend any given 
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amount of money on a player’s salary. In conclusion, the researchers found that a 
hierarchical salary structure led to an increase in team performance. 
Torgler, and Schmidt (2007) conducted a study in which they analyzed data from 
the Bundesliga (i.e., the top German soccer league) regarding salary structure and the 
success of teams. They collected data from the 1995-96 through to the 2003-04 season. 
There were a total of 1040 players used in the study. The authors found that hierarchical 
salary structures resulted in poorer team performance.  
Basketball 
Compared with the results identified above in soccer, Frick et al. (2003) found the 
opposite result when they studied basketball. Their study used payroll data from the 1990 
through 2000 NBA regular seasons to calculate Gini coefficients. They found there was a 
positive effect of salary inequality with a team’s performance which indicated that a 
hierarchical salary structure is better for team performance in basketball. 
Hockey  
Sommers (1998) conducted a study using data from the NHL 1996-97 regular 
season to measure team performance. He found that a smaller Gini coefficient indicated 
better team performance; in this case, points earned were the unit of analysis. The results 
indicate that a compressed structure would produce a better performing team.  
Gomez (2002) examined team performance over the course of the 1994-95 
through 1997-98 seasons. His original findings suggested that a hierarchical salary 
structure was linked to higher winning percentages; however, after he controlled “for the 
winning “legacy” of teams with fixed effects estimators, then the sign on salary inequality 
reverses and confirms that salary inequality is detrimental to performance” (p. 25). 
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Gomez regressed the seasonal differences between salary inequality and team payrolls to 
account for the winning “legacy” factor. An increase in 0.1 of the Gini coefficient had a 
negative 1.7 percent on winning percentage. Gomez’s results further indicate that a 
compressed salary structure promotes winning percentage; however, Frick et al. (2003) 
found differing results in their study. They found a small relationship between salary and 
team performance (winning percentage) in their study of the NHL for the seasons 1988, 
1993, and 1995 through 2000. The relationship was small and it suggested that 
hierarchical salary structures increased a team’s performance.  
Finally, Marchand et al. (2006) examined the NHL seasons between 2000 and 
2004 to determine whether salary inequality had a positive or negative relationship on 
performance. The authors found that there was a positive relationship between inequality 
and performance (winning percentage and points earned), which differs from both 
Sommers’ (1998) and Gomez’s (2002) findings.  
Sommers (1998) used points as their dependent variable and Frick et al. (2003) 
used winning percentage. Both, however, used the Gini coefficient as the independent 
variable. Marchard et al., (2003) used two percentile ratios alongside the Gini coefficient. 
Although inequality of salary was statistically significant, they found that the farther 
teams advanced in the playoffs, the more compressed salary structures were. They 
divided mean salaries by star effect and journeymen effect. Star effect accounted for every 
player above the mean salary, and journeymen effect accounted for the bottom half.  
Marchand et al. (2006) also outlined that for future studies,  
... the unanswered question is whether these relationships will hold under the new 
CBA with a firm upper cap on salaries. While the answer is several years away, it 
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will be important to compare the productivity effects of the new CBA with the 
ones found in this study (p.14).  
In sum, the results of the four papers were different, which provides a strong 
rationale for conducting this particular study. Furthermore, all sports that display 
characteristics of reciprocal interdependence had varying results for both hierarchical and 
compressed salary structures; this gives further justification for studying this topic as 
clarity is needed. 
Individual Performance and Salary 

There have been few studies focused on the individual performance of players in 
team sports in relation to their salary. As mentioned earlier, different sports have different 
degrees of interdependence with sports such as hockey, basketball, football, and soccer 
being highly co-dependent on teammates for productive performance, while a baseball 
player’s offensive production is highly dependent on individual skill, not their teammates. 
The following section outlines individual performance and salary related academic 
literature.  
Baseball 
Harder (1992) examined pay for performance in players that were either under- or 
over-rewarded for their performance. The purpose was to determine if under-rewarded 
players would exhibit behaviours that would negatively affect their teams. He created an 
equation to measure both offensive and defensive statistics in baseball. He found players 
who were under-rewarded did not decrease their effort as it might jeopardize their future 
careers. Harder (1992) was able to develop different equations based on previous studies 
regarding salary determination. The  
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independent variables were selected on the basis of theoretical and empirical 
relevance and included performance, seniority, salary-determination procedures 
(e.g., free agency), All-Star status, race or ethnicity, organizational variables, and 
position played. The goal of the analysis was to explain the greatest degree of 
variance with theoretically meaningful variables (p. 324-325). 
Bloom (1999) created an equation to measure individual player performance in 
MLB in relation to salary. He found there was a negative relationship to performance 
when there was a hierarchical salary structure. This negative relationship also suggests 
that players on teams with hierarchical pay structures are not performing at their optimal 
level.  
Hall, et al. (2002) used payroll data from 1980 through 2000 to determine what 
type of relationship existed between wage and performance; however, no directional 
relationship existed until data from 1995 to 2000 illustrated a bi-directional relationship 
(is both negative and positive). This study is important because it shows the clear link 
between wage and performance.  
Chuang et al. (2011) created an individual performance equation for baseball. The 
equation measured “the relationship between individual performance and individual 
salary, which as such considers the effect of salary structure and individual player salary 
on individual performance” (p. 10). In hierarchical salary structures, they found that 
athletes who were paid a larger amount performed better than those paid a small amount. 
They also found that a smaller salary structure equated to poorer individual performances 
by athletes who had high salaries.  
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Soccer 
Torgler and Schmidt (2007) studied the Bundesliga (a German professional soccer 
league) and determined individual performance based on income. The study indicated 
players’ individual performances were negatively correlated to hierarchical pay 
structures. The negative correlation indicated that players who received a small salary on 
a hierarchical salary structure team would not perform at an optimal level. They found a 
linear relationship between payroll to performance, but not vice versa. In other words, 
performance did not have an affect on salary but rather salary affected performance.  
Basketball 

Wallace (1988) studied individual performance and its relationship to salary in the 
NBA using fifteen independent variables. Using data from the 1984-85 seasons, variables 
included were: draft position, years playing, all-star appearances, position, and player 
mobility. All data outcomes were ratio based according to minutes played. Wallace found 
that when a player changed teams there was a significant and negative effect on his 
performance. He also found that scoring and rebounding were positively correlated to 
salary. This study is helpful as it gives examples as to which variables are highly 
correlated to salary.  
Harder’s (1992) article tested performance of over and under-rewarded players. 
Alongside his study of baseball, he also studied basketball, a sport that features reciprocal 
interdependence. He found that under-rewarded players negatively affected their team’s 
performance by exhibiting selfish behaviour, while over-rewarded players statistics 
suggested that their actions were more team orientated. The statistics were measured as a 
ratio based in minutes played.  
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Hockey 
Gomez (2002) examined individual performance of players in relation to salary. 
He looked at a number of variables such as, points per game, experience and place of 
birth. He gathered information from two seasons and excluded goalies within the study. 
His results suggested that individual performance was negatively affected by salary 
inequality.  
Finally, Marchand et al. (2006) examined the effects of salary on team and 
individual performance in the NHL. They collected data over four seasons (2000-01 
through 2003-04) related to individual and team characteristics. The Gini coefficient was 
used to measure inequality in salaries and the authors found salary inequality to be 
positively related to individual performance. Those players that were above the mean 
salary who were classified as star effect players performed better with higher inequality 
(i.e., a hierarchal salary structure). 
Berri and Brook (2010) researched NHL goalies by examining “voting records for 
the Vezina Award (best goalie of the year award in the NHL) and salary data from free 
agent goalies to ascertain how the goalie position is evaluated by general managers in the 
NHL” (p.157). They looked at a number of variables including save percentage, goals 
against average, age, and minutes played. Their results suggested that there was no 
relationship between current pay and current save percentage between goalies. However, 
when examining unrestricted free agents, one and two years prior to signing a new 
contract save percentage was statistically significant. Additionally, they found that there 
were few individual differences between goalies in the NHL, which left the authors 
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wondering “if there is very little difference in the performance of goalies, why would any 
team pay much more than the minimum salary to acquire a goalie?” (p.167). 
The literature offers no clear answer for individual performance of athletes as to 
whether a hierarchical or compressed salary structure promotes individual output for both 
pooled and reciprocal interdependent sports. Further studies need to be completed that 
measure individual performance in relation to salary. 
Summary 

The degree to which salaries affect both the team and individual performance of 
professional athletes has only recently become a focus for academics. The two types of 
salary structures that have the potential to impact team and individual performance are 
hierarchical and compressed. Tournament theory is the dominating framework employed 
to study how salary relates to team and individual performance. Pooled, sequential and 
reciprocal interdependence are important when analyzing performance statistics as each 
sport has a different degree of individual impact on the final score of a game. For 
example, baseball players have more of an individual impact on the outcome of a game 
because they bat individually, whereas for many other sports passing and team 
cooperation are needed to score. Based on the sport and whether it has characteristics of 
pooled, sequential or reciprocal interdependence, it is easier to measure both team and 
individual performance. There have been a number of studies examining various sports 
using tournament theory. The four studies completed in professional hockey yielded 
different results for team and individual performance. Marchand et al. (2006) suggested 
that further research needs to be conducted in this area and, therefore, the purpose of this 
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study is to investigate salary distribution in relation to team and player performance 
amongst NHL clubs.
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Chapter Three: Methods 

This chapter outlines the research methods employed to analyze the predictors 
between player performance and salary structure. The first research question was 
examined by conducting a regression analysis. The independent variable used was the 
Gini coefficient which was derived from team salaries. The dependent variable was team 
winning percentage. Furthermore, the researcher also examined the predictors between 
salary and individual performance statistics by way of another regression analysis. This 
chapter will include the samples needed to answer both research questions, the study 
variables, the validity and reliability of the data, and the statistical measures that were 
necessary to analyze the research questions.  
Research Question One 

1. Do salary structure types (hierarchal or compressed) serve to predict team 
performance for NHL professional hockey clubs? 
Sample 

The researcher collected and analyzed data from six NHL regular hockey seasons 
(2005-06 through 2010-11). The rationale for this decision was multifaceted. First, the 
researcher examined the NHL after the 2004-05 lockout to determine the impact of salary 
structure on a team’s ability to win under a salary cap system. Secondly, Marchand et al. 
(2006) suggested that a study should be conducted post lockout to see what affect a salary 
cap had on salary structures and winning percentages. All thirty NHL teams were 
included in the analysis. Using thirty teams over the course of six seasons totaled 180 
observations. Salary data were accessed from the USA Today salary database, as well as 
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from the NHL’s website. This was supported by previous research as Marchand et al. 
(2006) completed their study by accessing data from these two resources and the 
NHLPA’s website. The validity and reliability of these data will be discussed later in the 
chapter.  
Variables 

The first research question employed two variables: the Gini coefficient and the 
winning percentages of teams from 2005-06 season to the 2010-11 season. Total team 
salaries were acquired from the USA Today salary database. The second piece of 
information needed for the research question was winning percentage. A number of 
studies have already examined salary structure and team performance and have used 
winning percentage as their dependent variable (Avrutin & Sommers, 2007; Bloom, 
1999; Gomez, 2002; Marchand et al., 2006; Sommers, 1998; Vasilescu, 2007; Wisemen 
& Chatterjee, 2003). Winning percentage can be accurately calculated by dividing a 
team’s wins from games played. This information was acquired online from the 
NHL.com. 
Use of Secondary Data 

The use and analysis of secondary data have been documented in academic 
research as adding usefulness and reliability. There are a number of advantages associated 
with using secondary data for research. Kiecolt and Nathan (1985) suggested that 
secondary data allow researchers to save both time and money in using pre-existing data 
sets. Additionally, secondary data can be derived from a number of different research 
designs. However, there are disadvantages to secondary data. Kiecolt and Nathan (1985) 
outline that a potential major issue involves data availability. There may be issues with a 
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researcher’s access or the very existence of the required data needed for the study. 
Additionally, when analyzing secondary data other issues that may arise are the 
uncertainty of data quality, as well as an inability to see original errors in data collection 
(Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985). Only secondary data were used for both research questions as 
all of the required data were available on the internet. 
Validity and Reliability 

 The data used for this thesis were acquired from the USA Today salary 
database, and NHL.com. According to Marchand et al. (2006), the USA Today 
database was created and compiled by “sports reporters and editors based on 
information obtained from documents, agents and staff research” (p. 18). 
Previous research has utilized this approach and accepted it as providing valid 
salary data. Furthermore, in the case of a player engaged in a multi-year contract, 
the terms for only the current year were used, plus a prorated signing bonus, if 
applicable. Incentive and award clauses were not included. (Marchand et al., 
2006, p.18) 
Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient was created by an Italian economist named Corrado Gini. He 
wrote three major articles regarding the Gini coefficient in 1912, 1914, and 1936. The 
Gini coefficient measures levels of economic equality or inequality within a range of 0 
and 1. Zero represents perfect equality (i.e., everyone is paid the same amount), while 1 
represents perfect inequality (i.e., one person on a team is making all of the money). A 
significant number of studies regarding salary structure and team performance have used 
the Gini coefficient as a measure of salary equality/inequality (Avrutin & Sommers, 
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2007; Bloom, 1999; Frick et al., 2003; Gomez, 2002; Jewell & Molina, 2004; Marchand 
et al., 2006; Sommers, 1998; Vasilescu, 2007; Wisemen & Chatterjee 2003). The Lorenz 
curve is a visual depiction of the Gini coefficient. According to Hainsworth (1964) “the 
main value of a Lorenz-type diagram (shown in Figure 1) is that it allows for visual and 
quantitative comparison of the cumulative relationship between two variables with the 
overall arithmetic mean relationship” (p. 426).  
In a Lorenz curve, the ‘y’ axis represents total salaries of professional hockey 
teams, while the ‘x’ axis represents the lowest to highest of team salaries; the 45 degree 
angle represents perfect equality. 
Figure 1 - The Lorenz Curve 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Gini coefficient can be determined by finding the ratio between the line of 
equality (45 degree line; see Figure 1) and the Lorenz curve (which is marked by A) over 
the total area under it (B) plus the Lorenz curve (A). This equation can be seen as the Gini 
coefficient: 
 
 
Bloom (1999) outlined that a team Gini coefficient can be calculated as: 
A
(A + B)
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Team Gini coefficient  =  
Here, s1…sn is individual player salary on a given team arranged in order of 
decreasing salary, s is the mean salary of this team, and n is the number of players 
on this team. A separate Gini coefficient is computed for each team in each year. 
(Chuang et al., 2011, p. 11).  
The Gini coefficient was calculated by using a free online statistics calculator. 
This same website (www.wessa.net/co.waspȌwas used by Sommers (1998) in his 
analysis of team salary structures for the 1996-97 regular season. Once the Gini 
coefficient was calculated, a regression analysis was employed to determine if salary 
structure helped to predict teams winning percentages. 
Regression Analysis 

A regression analysis serves to find a prediction between the dependent and 
independent variable. The independent variable used in the first research question was the 
Gini coefficient and the dependent variable was winning percentage. An OLS regression 
was conducted. According to Moore and McCabe (2006), a regression line “is a straight 
line that describes how a response variable y changes as an exploratory variable x 
changes” (p.145). The OLS method “minimizes the sum of squares of the vertical 
distances of the observed y-values from the line” (p.145). Previous studies have used an 
OLS regression to determine the strength and direction of the variables potential 
predictions (Avrutin & Sommers, 2007; Marchand et al., 2006). The OLS regression 
analysis was computed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software, version 19.  
1+
1
n
−
2
n2s
(s1 + 2s2 + ...+ nsn )
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Research Question Two 

2. How do NHL goalie performance measures relate to professional goalie salaries? 
Sample 

 In an attempt to further understand player salaries and performance in professional 
hockey, the researcher examined starting goalies in the NHL over the course of six 
regular seasons (2005-06 through 2010-11). The rationale for this decision involved an 
interest in examining salary and individual players’ performance. As per the new CBA, 
the NHL has a hard salary cap system which means that salary management has become 
vital for a team’s success. If a team was able to project an accurate way of measuring 
performance in relation to salary, or determine a financial value for an individual, salary 
cap management would become easier. In this study, the researcher intentionally only 
collected data from NHL.com involving goalie performance. The researcher purposely 
limited the number of observations to goalies that had played at least 30 games 
(Marchand et al., 2006). This delimitation ensured that only starting goalies were 
included within this study, and eliminates the statistics of ‘backup’ players whose 
performance measurements may not be true to their skill with a limited number of games 
played. 
Variables 

The regression analysis had one dependent variable and a number of independent 
variables. The dependent variable in this equation was the goalie’s individual salary. 
There were a number of possible independent variables that could have been used for 
goalie performance measures. All variables that were included in the study were acquired 
from the NHL.com. The researcher was under the assumption that because the NHL posts 
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these statistics that they would consider them strong measures of performance. The 
researcher was using a data driven approach so all variables were included from the 
website. Table 3 identifies the list of potential variables that were included in the study 
alongside their short and full names. To avoid multi-collinearity, certain statistics were 
omitted (i.e., goals allowed and shots on net when save percentage was already included 
in the study). 
Table 3– Potential variables for study 

Variable Full name 
GP Games Played 
W Wins 
L Losses 
OT Overtime Losses 
GAA Goals Against Average 
SV% Save Percentage 
SO Shutouts 
SOW Shootout Wins 
SOL Shootout Losses 
SOS% Shootout Save Percentage 
 
Use of Secondary Data 

This researcher used a data driven approach in determining the statistics used in 
the regression analysis. By using NHL.com, the researcher took all pertinent statistics 
related to goalie performance and analyzed them in a regression analysis. However, 
before the regression analysis was completed a number of regression assumptions needed 
to be checked, (i.e., a Pearson’s correlation analysis). This analysis ensured that all 
statistics used were not highly correlated to one another.  
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Validity and Reliability 
The data collected were from the same secondary sources as from the previous 
research question. Therefore, the reliability of the data collected depends on those 
sources; at the same time, the databases and web sites used for data collection have been 
used in previous studies, which adds legitimacy to data set reliability (Marchand, et al., 
2006).   
Regression Analysis 

In order to answer the second research question, a simultaneous regression was 
used. The rationale for this analysis was two-fold: first, simultaneous regressions include 
all variables in its analyses and, second, this type of regression is used for exploratory 
purposes. Since there has been little academic research completed regarding predictors of 
salary for professional hockey goalies, this type of regression analysis was deemed 
appropriate. In a regression analysis, there is a dependent variable which stays constant 
throughout the analysis. Here, the dependent variable was individual player salary. The 
rationale for the study aimed to determine which measures (i.e., statistics) best served to 
predict a player’s salary. Unlike the dependent variable, there could be a number of 
independent variables. These independent variables were illustrated earlier in the chapter. 
Each of the independent variables were measured in relation to the dependent variable to 
determine whether they were effective predictors of salary. The simultaneous regression 
was computed using the computer program SPSS software, version 19. 
When a regression analysis is used, a formula dictates how many observations are 
needed based on how many independent variables are included in the study. This ensures 
the experiment has enough power. Moore and McCabe (2006) describe power as, “the 
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probability that a fixed level  significant test will reject  when a particular 
alternative value of the parameter is true” (p. 431). The formula to determine if a 
hypothesis has enough power is as follows: 
n > 50+8(IV) 
For every independent variable added to a regression analysis, an additional eight 
observations are necessary on top of the mandatory fifty. The n represents a total number 
of observations and this total must be greater than the right side of the equation to have 
enough power. For example, if this study used a total of ten independent variables, the 
study would need to have greater than 130 observations to ensure the experiment would 
have enough power.  
n > 50+8(10) 
n > 50+80 
n > 130 
By having enough power in this research study it also reduced the chance of Type II 
error. Type II error occurs when a statistical test fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
Summary 

 This chapter described the methods used to answer the research questions posed in 
the study. The thesis only included data from NHL regular seasons from 2005-06 through 
2010-11. This was because the focus of the study was on the NHL’s post lockout 
timeframe and the introduction of a hard salary cap system. Only secondary data were 
used for the analyses; there are both positive and negative effects of using secondary data 
as previously outlined. Regression analyses were used for both research questions. The 
statistical measure used as a predictor to team performance was the Gini coefficient. This 
α H 0
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chapter has included information regarding sample collection, different variables for 
analysis, use of secondary data, validity and reliability, and, finally, the statistical 
measures that were used to analyze the data. 
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Chapter Four: Results and Discussion 
 
 This chapter will focus on the statistical results analyzed in this study. The 
purpose of the study was to examine player salary in relation to performance. The first 
research question examined salary inequality and team winning percentages. The second 
analyzed salary data in relation to individual goalie performance statistics.  The results 
section of this chapter includes descriptive statistics, regression analyses assumptions, 
results, and finally, the main findings of both research questions. The discussion portion 
of this chapter will focus on the results of the study in relation to previous academic 
work. Discussion of the rationale to support tournament theory, how reciprocal 
interdependence affects hockey, the effect of the CBA on team performance, individual 
performance and salary and, finally, other reciprocal interdependent sports will be 
compared in relation to both team and individual performance.  
Descriptive Statistics 

Outlining the descriptive statistics provides a better understanding of data and 
ensures there are not any issues with its central tendencies (i.e., outliers, shape of the 
curve, and variation). The descriptive statistics included are the mean, mode, standard 
deviation, and, finally, the minimum and maximum values. It is critical to include these 
last two descriptive statistics because both variables (i.e., winning percentage and Gini 
coefficient) have a scale from 0 to 1 and knowing where each variable falls within the 
range is important. 
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Research Question 1 
 
 The first research question analyzed two variables: winning percentage and the 
Gini coefficient. There were a total of 178 observations. The mean and standard deviation 
for winning percentage were (M = 0.499; SD = 0.089). The mode was 0.500. The lowest 
winning percentage across six seasons was 0.256, and the highest was 0.707. The Gini 
coefficient’s mean and standard deviation were (M = 0.432; SD = 0.44). The variable had 
multiple modes; the smallest of which was 0.314. The lowest (minimum) Gini coefficient 
was 0.314, and the highest (maximum) was 0.543. Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Appendix A – Table 5.  The Lorenz curve for team salaries from 2005-06 to 2010-11 
seasons can be found in Appendix B – Figure 5.  
Research Question 2 
 
 In the second research question we examined the predictive nature of individual 
performance measures of NHL goalies to goalie salary. A total of eight independent 
variables were used in the regression analysis. There were a total of 245 observations. 
The mean and standard deviation of all variables included in the regression analysis were: 
games played (M = 51.3; SD = 13.45), losses (M = 18; SD = 6.14), overtime losses (M = 
5.6; SD = 2.53), goals against average (M = 2.7; SD = 0.35), save percentage (M = 0.908; 
SD = 0.011), shutouts (M = 3.18; SD = 2.34), shootout wins (M = 3.19; SD = 2.15), 
shootout losses (M = 3.2; SD = 1.8), and shootout save percentage (M = 0.662; SD = 
0.134). Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A – Table 10. 
Regression Analysis 

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 Regression analyses were performed in relation to both research questions and, in 
what follows, various factors are discussed in the context of the specific focus of the 
questions. 
Research Question 1 
 
In what follows, a brief description of the assumptions about regression analysis 
relevant to the first research question is provided.  
Assumptions. 

 It is important to outline the assumptions of a regression analysis in order to 
ensure the reliability of the analytical outcome. These assumptions include: missing data, 
a linear relationship between the variables, univariate normal distribution, normal 
distribution, univariate outliers, multi collinearity, and multivariate normal distribution. 
 First, there were no missing data in the data set.  A scatter plot (see Figure 2) was 
created to determine if there was a linear relationship between winning percentage and 
the Gini coefficient; the scatter plot indicated that there was. The darker dots on the 
scatter plot provide a slight indication of a linear relationship (i.e., the higher the winning 
percentage the higher the Gini coefficient).  
 
 
 



 


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Figure 2 – Winning Percentage and Gini Coefficient Scatter Plot 


 
Histograms were created to examine the univarite normal distribution. Both 
variables were normally distributed (as shown in Figures 3 and 4). The winning 
percentage and Gini coefficient variables did not show signs of kurtosis or skewness. The 
assumption was accepted. There were not any univariate outliers, thus, this assumption 
was accepted.  
Figure 3 – Winning Percentage Histogram 
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Figure 4 – Gini Coefficient Histogram 
 
A Pearson correlation test was done to assess the multi collinearity assumption to 
determine if winning percentage and the Gini coefficient were highly correlated. The 
Pearsons r equated to 0.158, which showed that the two variables were not highly 
correlated (see Appendix A – Table 6). This assumption was accepted. 
The next assumption that was examined was multivariate normal distribution. 
Mahalanobis distance was used and compared to a chi square table with a p value of 0.01; 
there was 1 degree of freedom. The chi square chart indicated that anything above 
Mahalanobis distance number of 6.63 would be considered an outlier. There were a total 
of two outliers; both were eliminated from the study1. This assumption was accepted.  
Analysis. 

A simple linear regression was completed to determine if the Gini coefficient was 
an effective predictor of team performance (winning percentage). The regression analysis 

1 The two teams eliminated from the study were the Minnesota Wild (2005-06) and the 
Carolina Hurricanes (2008-09).  
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showed the Gini coefficient to be a significant predictor of salary. The results of the 
regression were; [R2 = 0.025, F (1, 176) = 4.483, p < 0.036]. The R2 indicates the strength 
of the predictor variable; the Gini coefficient accounted for 2.5% of winning percentage. 
The beta values were positive [ȕ = 0.158] which suggests to the researcher that the 
prediction is positive (see Appendix A – Tables 7 - 9). In other words, an increase in the 
Gini coefficient equated to an increase in winning percentage.  
Research Question 2 
 
In what follows, a brief description of the assumptions about regression analysis 
relevant to the second research question is provided. 
Assumptions. 

 As mentioned from the first research question it is important to outline the 
assumptions of a regression analysis in order to ensure the reliability of the analytical 
outcome. These assumptions include: missing data, a linear relationship between the 
variables, univariate normal distribution, normal distribution, univariate outliers, multi 
collinearity, and multivariate normal distribution.  
 There were no missing data recorded in this study, and therefore the assumption 
regarding handling missing data was accepted. The next assumption that was met was 
univariate normal distribution. Histograms were completed for all variables (see 
Appendix B – Figures 6 -14). The skewness and kurtosis of the variables included in this 
study are shown in Table 4. Games played was slightly negatively kurtotic at -1.103. No 
other variables exceeded the range of -1 to 1 in either skewness or kurtosis. As a result, it 
can be deduced that all variables were normally distributed. This assumption was 
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accepted. Due to the large variance of range in the given variables, there were a number 
of univariate outliers. This assumption was not accepted.  
Table 4 – Skewness & Kurtosis of Research Question Two 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Salary 0.916 -0.222 
Games Played 0.101 -1.103 
Losses 0.183 -0.784 
Overtime Losses 0.113 -0.499 
Save Percentage -0.357 -0.285 
Shutouts 0.784 0.362 
Shootout Wins 0.881 0.454 
Shootout Losses 0.417 -0.072 
Shootout Save 
Percentage -0.359 0.845 
 
In the second research question, the researcher examined a number of different 
variables as predictors of goalie salary. A Pearson’s correlation analysis was completed to 
determine if any of the variables were highly correlated. Wins and games played were 
highly correlated to 0.871. Due to the strong relationship between these two variables 
wins was removed from the study. Save percentage and goals against average were highly 
correlated to 0.815. As a result goals against average was eliminated from the study (see 
Appendix A – Table 11). A scatter plot matrix was completed (see Appendix B – Figure 
15). All variables had a linear relationship. Thus, the assumption was accepted.  
The next assumption that was examined was multivariate normal distribution. 
Mahalanobis distance was used and compared to a chi square table with a p value of 0.01; 
the degrees of freedom was 9. The chi square chart indicated that anything above 21.66 
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would be considered an outlier. There were a total of three outliers, all of which were 
eliminated from the study2. This assumption was accepted. 
Analysis. 

A simultaneous regression was employed to determine which goalie performance 
measures were the best predictors of salary. The rationale for this method of analysis was 
two-fold: first, simultaneous regression includes all variables in its analysis, and, second, 
this type of regression is used for exploratory purposes. Further reasoning included that 
there has been limited previous research conducted regarding goalie statistics and salary 
(Berri & Brook, 2010). The regression was statistically significant, [R2 = 0.198, F (8,235) 
= 7.26, p < 0.001]. The eight variables included in the regression analysis equated to 
19.8% of the prediction to salary. Games played was the only statistically significant 
variable; [ȕ = 0.311, p < 0.05] (see Appendix A – Tables 12-14). 
Main Findings 

In relation to Research Question 1: Do salary structure types (hierarchical or 
compressed) serve to predict team performance for NHL professional hockey clubs?, the 
following findings emerged as significant. As per the regression analysis, it was 
determined that the Gini coefficient significantly predicted winning percentage (p < 0.05). 
This statistic means that salary structure is important for predicting team performance. 
However, when the regression analysis was completed the r2 = 0.025. This statistic 
showed that the Gini coefficient (salary structure types) only equated 2.5% of the 
prediction to salary. This is a very small percentile as there is still 97.5% of the predictors 

2 The three goalies that were eliminated from the study were Jonathan Quick – Los 
Angeles Kings (2010-11), Martin Brodeur – New Jersey Devils (2006-07), and Vesa 
Toskala – San Jose Sharks (2006-07). 
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unaccounted for in this study. The statistics signify that the Gini coefficient is a positive 
predictor; however, it is not a strong predictor. The beta levels suggest that there is a 
positive prediction between the two variables [ȕ = 0.158, p < 0.05]. This indicates that the 
higher the Gini coefficient, the higher the winning percentage will be. In sum, salary 
structures do serve to predict team performance; however, the level of prediction is very 
small. Furthermore, the more dispersed a team’s salary is (hierarchical salary structure) 
the higher their winning percentage will be.  
In relation to research question two: How do NHL goalie performance measures 
relate to professional goalie salaries?, the following results emerged as significant. A total 
of eight independent variables were used in the regression analysis to determine which 
goalie statistics were the best predictors to salary. Salary and goalie statistics were 
statistically significant (p < 0.001). The r2 = 0.198 indicated to the researcher that the 
predictor variables used in the study accounted for 19.8% of goalie performance measures 
ability to predict salaries. One of the eight independent variables used in the study was 
statistically significant; the variable was games played  (p < 0.05). Games played had a 
positive beta, which suggests that there is positive prediction between this variable and 
salary. A surprising result was that save percentage was not statistically significant (p > 
.584).  
Games played is linked to team performance. None of the results showed 
individual performance measures to be statistically significant. In hockey, as suggested by 
the results of the study, goalie performance is important for the overall team’s 
performance. The data also suggests that goalies with higher salaries play more games, [ȕ 
= 0.311, p < 0.05]. The results of the thesis indicate that individual goalie performance 
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measures do not relate to salary, but do relate to overall team records (games played 
equates to total wins and losses). This provides evidence that hockey is a sport that has 
characteristics of reciprocal interdependence. Reciprocal interdependent sports refer to 
team sports in which a number of players’ outputs are needed for an outcome (win or 
loss). The outcome of team performance is linked to overall group performance.  
Discussion 
 
 In what follows, an extended discussion of the team salary structure and 
individual performance regression results will be completed. 
Team Salary Structure 

The results of this research provide interesting insight into the understanding of 
team and player performance in relation to salary. Tournament theory holds that team and 
player performance are increased when salary is highly dispersed in an organization 
(Frick, 2003). The results of the study indicate that tournament theory is an effective 
explanation of salary and performance in the NHL after the 2004-05 lockout. The 
evidence suggests that hierarchical pay structures predict better team performance. This 
chapter focuses on the results of the study in relation to previous research, including 
rationale to support tournament theory, how reciprocal interdependence effects hockey, 
the effect of the CBA, and, finally, how other reciprocal interdependent sports affect team 
performance and salary. 
Four studies have been completed analyzing salary and team performance in the 
NHL. Marchand, et al., (2006) recommended that a study be completed some years after 
the new CBA to determine what impact its implementation had on the NHL in regard to 
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salary dispersion and performance. The results of this study suggested that an increase in 
the Gini coefficient would result in an increase in team winning percentage, (i.e., the 
more dispersed a team’s salary in a hierarchical salary structure, the greater their winning 
percentage will be). The results of this study are congruent with two of the four previous 
studies completed. Both Frick et al., (2003) and Marchand et al., (2006) found that 
hierarchal salary structures induced better team performance, whereas both Gomez (2002) 
and Sommers (1998) found that compressed salary structures induced better team 
performance.  
Sommers (1998) examined the 1996-97 NHL hockey season and found that the 
more compressed a team’s salary structure, the greater their total number of points 
accrued. Frick, et al., (2003), Gomez (2002), and Sommers (1998) all examined similar 
seasons. Both Frick et al., (2003) and Gomez (2002) looked at a number of seasons in 
their studies, whereas Sommers (1998) used the statistics from only one season. All the 
researchers that analyzed more than four hockey seasons, including this study, had results 
which suggested that hierarchal salary structures were more beneficial to a team’s 
winning percentage, with the exception of Gomez (2002). It was not until Gomez 
accounted for one of his variables called the winning “legacy” did his results indicate that 
a compressed salary structure increased winning percentage. Rationale for not including 
the winning ‘legacy’ into this study was literature-based, as the majority of research 
articles reviewed did not use a method to account for salary inequality and changes in 
team payroll over seasons. In future research, sample size may be important when 
attempting to examine the predictors between salary structure and team performance. 
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A study of the four seasons prior to the lockout (2000-01 through 2003-04) by 
Marchand et al. (2006) suggested that hierarchical salary structures increased winning 
percentages. It could be deduced that since the 2000-01 season, teams with higher salary 
dispersion have been more successful. Although this study’s results were statistically 
significant the Gini coefficient did not account for a large variance of winning percentage. 
However, from a statistical standpoint the results suggest that the 2004-05 lockout did not 
have a large effect on salaries and performance in the NHL. As seen in Table 1, although 
salaries decreased slightly post lockout, they steadily began to rise and are currently 
stalled. The lockout also did not affect the dispersion of salary between players. There is 
still a stark difference between the average earned salary of a player and that of a player 
earning the league maximum. The new CBA helped the league set a salary ceiling, so 
there is a limit that any individual player can earn annually. This new ceiling helps to 
limit salary dispersion as seen in the maximum Gini coefficient. This limit also allows 
teams to sign top tier players to a maximum salary, while still having enough money left 
to sign other players to large contracts. The same can be said for the salary cap floor 
which is set by the league that dictates the lowest amount a team can spend on an 
individual player and on a team as a whole. This may be an explanation as to the why the 
range of the Gini coefficient was relatively small throughout the sample.  
The current study’s results indicate that the Gini coefficient was only a small 
predictor of winning percentage. With the current CBA, a hard salary cap system affects 
how teams manage their payroll. This includes which teams offer contracts to which 
players and how much is offered. Although the level of prediction between the two 
variables was quite small, its statistical significance should not be ignored. With a steady 
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increase in the league salary cap, teams are able to award large contracts to a number of 
individuals. As the prediction between the Gini coefficient and winning percentage was 
positive, the results suggest that larger contracts to a few individual players increases the 
likelihood of a team’s winning percentage being higher. Managers may be relying heavily 
on individual players to perform at a higher level than other players on a team. Although 
there has been a steady increase in the hard salary cap since 2006, individual players 
earning season high salaries have remained relatively the same (see Table 1). As a result   
general managers have salary cap room to sign other ‘star players’ before team’s salary 
caps levels are achieved. 
Previous research suggested that hierarchical salary structures increased a team’s 
performance (Frick et al., 2003, Marchand et al., 2006); however, with the 
implementation of the hard salary cap system, the researcher anticipated that compressed 
salary structures would increase a team’s winning percentage, but the results suggested 
otherwise. The more dispersed a team’s salary structure, the more wins they had. This 
dispersion may be a result of a ‘star player.’ In their research papers both Frick et al. 
(2003) and Marchand et al. (2006) suggested that star players increase the dispersion of 
salary among teams. This dispersion might result from the number of players (only six) 
that in hockey are allowed on the ice at one time. It is understandable that teams that are 
paying higher salaries to a few individuals should want them on the ice for a longer 
period of time.  Furthermore, Marchand, et al.’s (2006) results suggest that the effect of a 
‘star player’ far outweighed the benefits of journeymen (a player with average talent) for 
a team’s success. This point is further illustrated by Frick et al. (2003) in that “‘star 
players’ may be of paramount importance for the team’s performance – which, in turn 
PLAYER SALARIES AND PERFORMANCE 
  


56
will lead to a highly skewed distribution of player salaries without negatively affecting 
the performance of those at the lower end of the pay hierarchy” (p.479-480). Results of 
this research add further evidence to these findings as when a team has a higher Gini 
coefficient, they also have a higher winning percentage. The effect of the 2004-05 lockout 
did not have a great deal of influence on teams salary structures.  
One of the main purposes of this study was to determine the effect of the hard cap 
salary system on how teams manage their money, as outlined by Marchand et al. (2006) 
for future areas of research. The results were somewhat surprising from this perspective 
as the predictive value of the Gini coefficient to winning percentage was rather small. 
Frick et al., (2003) had similar results as their research indicated that a hierarchical salary 
structure increased winning percentage. The predictive results between the Gini 
coefficient and winning percentage was also rather small in their study. In the current 
paper, the prediction of the Gini coefficient only accounted for 2.5% of the variance to 
winning percentage (dependent variable). There are still a number of other factors that 
could potentially affect a team’s winning percentage that were not accounted for in this 
study. These factors could include: internal organizational matters such as injuries and 
game preparation, relationships between individuals on the team, coaching staff, coaching 
style, organizational pressure, and organizational culture. Each of these factors could 
potentially affect a team’s ability to win.  
Pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependent sports offer different 
perspectives on both team and individual performance. Examples of sports that exhibit 
reciprocal interdependence are basketball, soccer and hockey, whereas baseball can be 
considered a sport that exhibits characteristics of pooled interdependence and football as a 
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sport that exhibits sequential interdependence. A comparison between the results of this 
particular study and the studies that have already been completed is imperative in 
understanding the scope of the research results.  
In comparison to other reciprocal interdependent sports (soccer and basketball), 
there has not been a consensus on what salary structure equates to more successful teams 
(i.e., examples of success could be defined as, but are not limited to, winning percentage 
and total points earned). The results vary based on the study and sport. Some of the 
research completed suggests that a compressed salary structure promotes winning (Frick 
et al., 2003; Torgler, & Schmidt, 2007), whereas other studies suggest that teams are 
more successful with a hierarchical structure (Hall et al., 2002). An important difference 
between these sports is the maximum players allowed on the field at one time. In sports 
where few individuals are allowed on the playing surface at once (hockey and basketball) 
hierarchical salary structures may increase teams winning because of the signing of ‘star 
players’. For example, in Frick et al.’s (2003) study, intra-team wage dispersion was 
beneficial to basketball teams. The same results can be found in hockey (Frick et al., 
2003, Marchand et al., 2006). Sports such as football and soccer, which allow a larger 
number of individuals on the playing surface may benefit from having salary structures 
which are more compressed. This could be related to each individual player having a 
greater responsibility because of increased playing time. Frick et al. (2003) agrees with 
the notion that the larger the team size, the less an impact an individual has on the 
outcome of a game. Overall, it is evident through both past and present research that both 
team and individual performance is affected by salary.  
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Individual Performance 

 There have been few studies completed regarding the direct effect of individual 
goalie performance measures in predicting salary. Tournament theory would suggest that 
players who perform better will receive higher pay, and players who are paid less would 
try and increase their performances to increase their salaries (Chuang et al., 2011; Frick, 
2003; Huselid, 1992). The purpose of the second research question was to determine 
which goalie statistics best predicted salary. The results indicated that individual 
performance measures do predict salary. The results indicated that games played was the 
only significant variable. In other words, goalies that play more games have a higher 
salary. Theoretically speaking, better goalies play, and get paid more. The data shows that 
tournament theory is supported for individual performance of goalies. There are two 
major points that can be taken away from the results in comparison to past literature: first, 
the important role of reciprocal interdependence in hockey and, second, how the role of 
reciprocal interdependence varies among other sports. 
 No individual performance measures such as GAA or save percentage were found 
to be significant predictors of salary. An ad hoc explanation as to why no individual 
performance measures were significant is because hockey is a sport that is reciprocally 
interdependent. As illustrated earlier, the only variable found to be significant was games 
played. Games played is not controlled by the goalie, but rather the coach of the team and 
as a result can not be completely deemed as an individual performance statistic. Previous 
research has examined player physical characteristics (Gomez, 2002), and player 
individual (forward/defence) performance measures (Marchand et al., 2006). The only 
study to specifically examine goalie statistics was completed by Berri and Brook (2010). 
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Their results suggested that current statistics were not significant to salary, however, 
when examining one and two years prior to a goalie signing a new contract their save 
percentage was statistically significant. Berri and Brook (2010) concluded, “...predicting 
the future is quite difficult. When we further examine performance data for goalies, we 
can see why making predictions in this labour market is so difficult” (p. 162). The ability 
to determine future performance is not only difficult in hockey, but also in other sports.  
 Other research conducted in soccer offers a different perspective on individual 
performance and salary. Torgler & Schmidt, (2007) examined soccer players’ 
performance in relation to salary and found that an increase in salary dispersion led to a 
decrease in team performance. The results of this study found a negative correlation 
between those players who received a small salary that were on a team with a hierarchical 
salary structure. Ultimately, the players did not perform to their optimal level. This may 
be due to the larger number of individuals on a soccer field as opposed to a hockey arena.  
Frick et al. (2003) discussed the idea that because there is an increased amount of players 
playing a game, each individual has a greater responsibility due to his or her increased 
playing time. Based on this, these players were most likely receiving similar playing time 
as individuals who had higher salaries, their effort level may not have been as strong as if 
there had been a compressed salary structure in place. In sum, depending on the sport, the 
playing time given to each player, may have an effect on his or her performance, based on 
the salary structure the team is using.  
Hall et al.’s (2002) study regarding player performance and salary is important 
because it showed a clear link between salary and performance. The results of this study 
further support this notion. However, specific performance measures need to be more 
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accurately measured and identified in order for sport managers to make sound, knowledge 
based decisions. It is becoming increasingly evident that each sport is unique in its 
performance measures and how player’s performance should be identified and gauged by 
sport managers. Sport leaders in professional sport must help discover and classify these 
performance statistics in order to properly manage their payroll and offer appropriate 
contract offers. However, if goalie performance measures are not accurately predicting 
salary (i.e., the results of this study) then it is important to ask whether goalies in the NHL 
are overvalued.  
With a lack of academic literature regarding goalie performance and valuation of 
goalie performance, an examination of popular press articles was engaged. In hockey 
culture it is believed that goalies are the most important players on the ice at any given 
time. This point is further illustrated by David Johnson of hockeyanalysis.com, “I must 
say that my belief is that a goalie is by far the most valuable member of a team” (Johnson, 
2010, para. 12). Norman (2009), in the book Hockeynomics, also expounded on the 
importance of goalies:  “There are certainly times when a netminder is the root cause of a 
win” (p. 240). It is evident through popular press material that goalies have a significant 
impact on a team and a game. One could deduce, based on the discussions of these 
authors, that goalies are not over valued. 
Summary 

 This chapter included results and discussion of those results in relationship to 
literature that provided the foundation for this study. First, explanations of the underlying 
assumptions of the regression analyses were discussed. Additionally, the results of the 
study were outlined with in-depth analysis of what the statistics were and what they 
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meant in relation to the research questions. With both research questions answered, a 
broader examination of what the results meant in comparison to past literature was 
discussed. This discussion related the results to literature surrounding tournament theory, 
reciprocal interdependence, and the effect of the salary cap on salary dispersion on team 
and individual performance. The chapter also offered an explanation as to why 
hierarchical salary structures are related to an increase in winning percentage, the effect 
of ‘star players’ and finally, individual performance in relation to hockey and other 
reciprocal interdependent sports.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Limitations, & Future Research 
Conclusions 

Professional sport offers a unique opportunity to examine whether or not salary is 
actually related to performance of both organizations (teams) and employees (players). In 
this research we examine salary structure types (hierarchical or compressed) as predictors 
of team performance in the NHL. We also analyze goalie statistics in order to determine 
what, if any, performance measures help predict salary.  
1. There was a significant statistical prediction between team performance and salary 
structure (Gini coefficient). The Gini coefficient was found to be a weak predictor 
as it only accounted for 2.5% of winning percentage. The beta levels were positive 
which suggested to the researcher that hierarchical salary structures increase team 
performance. The results support the notion that tournament theory is an effective 
explanation of team performance.  
Although the Gini coefficient was found to be a statistically significant predictor 
of team performance it should be noted that it is not an effective predictor of 
performance. It may not have as much of a practical significance as compared to its 
statistical significance. It is from this respect that the applicability of the results to ‘real 
world’ situations may not be strong.  
2. In the matter of individual performance of goalies in relation to salary, the 
regression analysis found there to be a significant predictor between salary and 
individual goalie performance measures. Of the eight independent variables only 
games played was statistically significant. The beta level was positive, which 
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suggests that a goalie that plays more games has a higher salary. The data also 
suggests that the better the team performance the better the goalie statistics.  
Limitations 

 Some limitations of this thesis include the data used. The reliability of the data is 
based on the reliability of the website where it was accessed. Although previous articles 
have used the same source for their study it is important to address that there is a 
possibility that the data may be incorrect. As a result, if the data were wrong then that 
would mean that the results of the study are incorrect. Another limitation of the study is 
that it does not address how the players feel about salary dispersion. This was a 
quantitative study and as a result it did not include the thoughts and feelings of both 
managers and players. However, access to the managers and players would be extremely 
difficult to achieve. Additionally, another limitation of the study was the variables used 
for the second research question. The variables used in the study were accessed from 
NHL.com and were assumed to be the best statistics to measure goalie performance. 
Teams may have other statistics or drills to evaluate performance. The researcher would 
not have been able to directly observe goalie performance against those drills.  
 Finally, a further limitation of the study was that the first research question only 
had one independent variable in the regression analysis. This may be a reason why the 
analysis only accounted for 2.5% of variance to winning percentage.  
Future Research 

There are a number of potential studies that could be created using this thesis as a 
foundation for future research. Future studies based on the current study could examine 
the effects of the Gini coefficient on playoff teams. Although this study’s results suggest 
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that the more dispersed a team’s salary structure, the higher their winning percentage 
would be, previous research dictates that during the playoffs, the opposite is true. 
Research by Marchand et al., (2006) suggested that the further into the playoffs teams 
made it without being eliminated, the smaller their Gini coefficients were. A continuation 
of this study post lockout would give insight into how the lockout affected teams that 
made the playoffs and how far they advanced into the playoffs from the 2005-06 season 
onwards.  
Further, an analysis to determine the fluctuation of the importance of team salary 
compression and/or dispersion in relation to team success would be a fruitful area of 
research. Success could be defined as, but not limited to, winning percentage, division 
titles, and/or championships won. This approach would increase the understanding of a 
historic and economic climate of the NHL, as well as how the league has progressed or 
recessed over its existence. Additionally, it would provide a perspective on the historical 
power imbalance between players and owners.   
Future research should also focus on the effects of reciprocal interdependence on 
individual player’s performance statistics and their effect on salary determination for 
players. Although this study only examined goalie performance in relation to salary, it did 
not give a strong indication of what skills or personal performance measures were 
attributed to salary numeration. Future studies should focus both on forwards and 
defensemen and their specific individual performance measures to determine whether 
their statistics are related to salaries. If not, it would give greater evidence to support the 
notion that hockey is a sport that is defined by reciprocal interdependence. 
PLAYER SALARIES AND PERFORMANCE 
  


65
Additionally, a future study could analyze the effect of guaranteed versus 
unguaranteed contracts. The differences between these lies in that an individual who is 
under contract in a league under a guaranteed contract (e.g., NHL) is ensured the 
monetary value that the player’s contract dictates, regardless of injury or performance. 
Unguaranteed contracts do not provide this insurance because teams are not obligated to 
pay players if they do not play. An example of such a league would be the NFL. If a 
player is cut from a team, their contract is no longer valid and the team is not obligated to 
pay the player. Research examining the differences between guaranteed versus 
unguaranteed contracts could potentially determine if unguaranteed contracts yielded 
higher performance from athletes because their contracts are based on performance. As 
well, future studies could examine salary prior to contract signing as opposed to salaries 
of player’s current contracts. Berri and Brook (2010), in their study of goalie 
performance, limited their research to examine only unrestricted free agent goalies. Their 
results suggested that the current contracts of goalies studied where not significant 
predictors of current performance statistics.  
The conclusions of this study involve the idea that there are industry specific, 
professional sport indices related to identifying performance. For example, shots taken 
from certain areas of the offensive zone, save percentage on the power play, etc. 
However, in completing this research such detailed statistics were not available. Future 
studies could try and gain access to such data as it may add to the accounted variance of 
goalie salaries. Additionally, this paper did not attempt to find an “optimal” Gini 
coefficient for team performance. Avenues for futures research could attempt to identify 
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this “optimal” range or Gini coefficient level as it relates to maximized team 
performance.  
This chapter included final conclusions from both research questions as well 
implications for their statistical and practical significance. Limitations of this study were 
also included and finally, future areas of research were discussed. Due to the exploratory 
nature of this study a number of options were expressed that will hopefully enable future 
research attempts related to player salaries and performance in professional sport. 
  
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Appendix A – Supplementary Tables 
Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics of Winning Percentage and Gini Coefficient 


Statistics 
 WinnPerc Gini 
N Valid 178 178 
Missing 0 0 
Mean .49940 .43240 
Std. Error of Mean .006692 .003303 
Median .51200 .43114 
Mode .500a .314a 
Std. Deviation .089277 .044063 
Variance .008 .002 
Skewness -.394 -.200 
Std. Error of Skewness .182 .182 
Kurtosis -.138 -.087 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .362 .362 
Range .451 .229 
Minimum .256 .314 
Maximum .707 .543 
Sum 88.893 76.967 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 















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
Table 6 - Pearson Correlation – Winning Percentage and Gini Coefficient  


Correlations 
 WinnPerc Gini 
Pearson Correlation WinnPerc 1.000 .158 
Gini .158 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) WinnPerc . .018 
Gini .018 . 
N WinnPerc 178 178 
Gini 178 178 

























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
Table 7 - Regression Summary – Winning Percentage (dependent variable) and Gini 
Coefficient (independent variable) 


ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .035 1 .035 4.483 .036a
Residual 1.376 176 .008   
Total 1.411 177    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gini 
b. Dependent Variable: WinnPerc 
 







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Table 8 - Model Summary of Research Question One 


















Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .158a .025 .019 .088412 .025 4.483 1 176 .036
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gini 
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Table 9 – Beta Levels of Research Question One 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .361 .066  5.512 .000
Gini .319 .151 .158 2.117 .036
a. Dependent Variable: WinnPerc 
 


 


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Table 10 - Descriptive statistics of all variables in Research Question Two 
 
 
Salary 
Games 
Played Losses
Overtime 
Losses 
Save 
Percentage Shutouts 
Shootout 
Wins 
Shootout 
Losses 
Shootout Save 
Percentage 
N Valid 245 245 245 245 245 245 244 244 244
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Mean 2634526.73 51.29 18.06 5.62 .90859 3.18 3.19 3.20 .66231
Std. Error of 
Mean 
135849.483 .859 .393 .162 .000731 .150 .138 .115 .008610
Median 1700000.00 51.00 18.00 6.00 .91000 3.00 3.00 3.00 .67150
Mode 800000a 31 18 6 .916 2 2 4 .667
Std. Deviation 2126380.756 13.452 6.148 2.532 .011435 2.342 2.156 1.803 .134493
Skewness .916 .101 .193 .116 -.357 .784 .881 .417 -.359
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.156 .156 .156 .156 .156 .156 .156 .156 .156
Kurtosis -.222 -1.103 -.784 -.499 -.294 .362 .454 -.072 .845
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.310 .310 .310 .310 .310 .310 .310 .310 .310
Range 9550000 47 28 11 .059 11 10 9 .833
Minimum 450000 30 6 0 .879 0 0 0 .167
Maximum 10000000 77 34 11 .938 11 10 9 1.000
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
 


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Table 11 - Pearson Correlation of all variables in Research Question Two 

Correlations 
 
Salary
Games 
Played Losses
Overtime 
Losses 
Save 
Percentage Shutouts
Shootout 
Wins 
Shootout 
Losses 
Shootout Save 
Percentage 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Salary 1.000 .436 .338 .264 .162 .233 .201 .201 .024
Games Played .436 1.000 .683 .550 .331 .497 .522 .430 .140
Losses .338 .683 1.000 .299 -.045 .150 .257 .227 .110
Overtime Losses .264 .550 .299 1.000 .236 .210 .122 .765 -.253
Save Percentage .162 .331 -.045 .236 1.000 .575 .249 .301 .053
Shutouts .233 .497 .150 .210 .575 1.000 .313 .257 .125
Shootout Wins .201 .522 .257 .122 .249 .313 1.000 .103 .489
Shootout Losses .201 .430 .227 .765 .301 .257 .103 1.000 -.347
Shootout Save 
Percentage 
.024 .140 .110 -.253 .053 .125 .489 -.347 1.000

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Table 12 - Regression Analysis for Research Question Two 


ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.177E14 8 2.721E13 7.260 .000a
Residual 8.808E14 235 3.748E12   
Total 1.098E15 243    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Shootout Save Percentage, Save Percentage, Losses, Overtime 
Losses, Shootout Wins, Shutouts, Shootout Losses, Games Played 
b. Dependent Variable: Salary 
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Table 13 - Model Summary of Regression Analysis Research Question Two 


Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .445a .198 .171 1935990.674 .198 7.260 8 235 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Shootout Save Percentage, Save Percentage, Losses, Overtime Losses, Shootout Wins, Shutouts, Shootout Losses, Games 
Played 
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Table 14 – Beta Levels of Research Question Two 

Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -7502564.294 12688597.552  -.591 .555   
Games Played 49329.813 19979.991 .311 2.469 .014 .215 4.658
Losses 40101.821 31258.142 .116 1.283 .201 .418 2.394
Overtime Losses 54378.351 86397.892 .064 .629 .530 .326 3.072
Save Percentage 7749096.633 14128784.179 .042 .548 .584 .588 1.699
Shutouts 34892.425 72536.222 .038 .481 .631 .534 1.873
Shootout Wins 2661.233 80283.665 .003 .033 .974 .515 1.943
Shootout Losses -52483.124 115528.807 -.045 -.454 .650 .356 2.812
Shootout Save Percentage -622819.320 1202554.179 -.039 -.518 .605 .590 1.696
a. Dependent Variable: Salary 
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Appendix B – Supplementary Figures 

Figure 5 – Lorenz Curve from 2005-06 to 2010-11 seasons 
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Figure 6 - Salary Histogram 
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Figure 7 - Games Played Histogram 
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Figure 8 – Losses Histogram 
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Figure 9 – Overtime Losses Histogram 
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Figure 10 – Save Percentage Histogram 
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Figure 11 – Shutouts Histogram 
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Figure 12 – Shootout Wins Histogram 
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Figure 13 – Shootout Losses Histogram 
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Figure 14 – Shootout Save Percentage Histogram 
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Figure 15 – Scatter Plot Matrix Research Question Two Variables 
 
 
